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LAW & SOCIETY SYMPOSIUM
Race, Reputation, and the Supreme Court:
Valuing Blackness and Whiteness
FRAN LISA BUNTMAN PH.D.*
I. INTRODUCTION
"[I]f He Be A Colored Man... He Is Not Lawfully Entitled To The
Reputation Of Being A White Man."'
In the United States, being black, or not being white, has long been
seen as a sign of criminality, or at least criminal propensity.2 The notion
of racial profiling, recently the subject of considerable public attention,
assumes that police officers, among others, can successfully, if illegiti-
mately, use a person's race as an indicator of likely criminal conduct.
Racial profiling usually refers to the assumption of possible law-break-
ing by African Americans or Latino Americans, although it can be
applied to a person of any perceived race.' Most people are unlikely to
admit to the role that a person's skin color plays in their assessment of
* George Mason University, Administration of Justice. Thank you to Nathan Bigelow for
research assistance for this paper, and Chris Banks, Richard Banks, Paul Finkelman, David
Goldberg, Mark Graber, and Barbara Harlow for reading and commenting on earlier versions of
this paper. Many thanks to Jonathan Simon for inviting this submission and contribution. I also
want to acknowledge, with thanks, the University of Akron's Political Science Department for
sponsoring my presentation of this work at the Law and Society and American Political Science
Association's conferences in 2000.
1. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 549 (1896) (emphasis added).
2. See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, The Crime of Color, 67 TUL. L. REv. 2063 (1993); Sheri Lynn
Johnson, Racial Imagery in Criminal Cases, 67 TUL. L. REv. 1739 (1993).
3. In theory, whiteness can cause a person to be considered suspicious. For example, it
could be assumed that a white person driving in a black neighborhood is looking for drugs. Of
course, this suspicion of the white person assumes that African American communities are more
likely to have drugs available for sale and use.
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their worthiness or credibility. In practice, however, for many people
and not just police officers, race is frequently an indicator of suspicion,
usually in the case of people of color, or the lack of suspicion, usually in
the case of whites.
Practices such as racial profiling cannot be understood without
recourse to broader considerations of the ways in which American dis-
courses shape discussions on the link between race and reputation.
Assumptions made about the character of people because of their skin
color are assessments that assume a correlation between race and reputa-
tion. These racial reputations, however, are not confined to issues of
presumed innocence or criminality. For instance, common racial stereo-
types assign to African Americans reputations of athletic prowess or to
Asian Americans reputations of mathematical skill. Reputation is a
social attribute that refers to how a person is assessed and measured and
usually reflects generalized, common appraisals about the person or
group's standing and acceptance.'
Reputations may be positive or negative. To have a good reputa-
tion is to be well-regarded. Achieving or sustaining a good reputation
can be based on a person's actions or inactions, ideas or practices. Rep-
utation can also be imputed by signifiers and symbols. In the United
States and elsewhere, one of those signifiers of reputation was-and in
different and similar ways, still is-race. Americans came to "recog-
nize[ ] the reputational interest in being regarded as white as a thing of
significant value, which like other reputational interests, was intrinsi-
cally bound up with identity and personhood."5
This article explores aspects of the United States Supreme Court's
discourse regarding race and reputation, examining both consistencies
and shifts over time.6 It begins with a discussion of slavery, focusing on
the Scott v. Sanford7 decision. The impact of the Reconstruction
Amendments is discussed in the context of the Civil Rights Cases8 and
4. The Oxford English Dictionary offers a definition of reputation as "[t]he common or
general estimate of a person with respect to character or other qualities; the relative estimation or
esteem in which a person or thing is held." OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 678 (2d ed. 1989).
5. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1734 (1993).
Additionally Ariela Gross's discussion of reputation in jury trials that contested racial identity in
the Antebellum South argues that "reputation evidence" was used "to refer to testimony about a
person's acceptance in the community, including the person's associations with blacks or whites
and the racial status his neighbors assigned him-what he 'passed for."' Ariela Gross, Litigating
Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109,
147 (1998).
6. By comparison, Gross shows how the "law, broadly defined, played an important role in
constituting the cultural meaning of racial identities." Gross, supra note 5, at 112.
7. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
8. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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Plessy v. Ferguson.9 Decades later, Brown v. Board of Education'l
marked a well-recognized and decisive shift in the way the Court reas-
signed both racial rights and reputations. In analyzing post-civil rights
movement era cases concerning jury composition, affirmative action,
and the death penalty, however, this Article argues that the Court has
retained a world view, reflected in its discourse, in which whites and
African Americans are assigned very different reputations. Thus, the
challenge of obtaining equality in rights and reputation is carried into the
twenty-first century.
The Court's attitudes toward the meaning of race, which is nar-
rowed in this Article to the meaning of blackness and whiteness, are
important for at least two core reasons. First, the Court's pronounce-
ments affect the lives of real people. For instance, as the Court inter-
prets laws or the Constitution to expand or contract rights, real people
experience actual effects in their lives. Second, the Court not only
reflects societal views, but shapes, legitimizes, or challenges them.
Southerners and Democrats therefore embraced the majority decision in
Scott, while Northerners and Republicans favored and even dissemi-
nated Justice Curtis's dissent.' 1 Nearly a hundred years later, Brown
announced to segregationists that their views put them at odds with the
Constitution, and thus the nation. Ideas once considered radical-from
the principle of racial equality to the right of people, even criminal sus-
pects, to know their legal and constitutional rights-are often quickly
incorporated into the mainstream and hegemonic culture once the
Supreme Court asserts them as part of what the Constitution requires, or
even more crudely, as part of the meaning of being American.
II. SLAVERY As REPUTATION: A "STIGMA OF THE
DEEPEST DEGRADATION"' 2
Whether the Constitution as originally written in 1787 supported
slavery or contained the seeds of its undoing has long been debated by
jurists, scholars, and activists. In practice, however, the constitutional
clauses dealing with slavery served to protect this institution. Both the
three-fifths clause' 3 and fugitive slave clause 4 cast light on the meaning
of blackness and the personhood and reputation of African Americans as
slaves. According to the three-fifths compromise, slaves or "all other
9. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
10. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
11. PAUL FINKELMAN, DRED Scorr v. SANDFORD: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 49,
109 (1997).
12. Scott, 60 U.S. at 409.
13. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3.
14. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
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Persons"' 15 were counted as three fifths of a person for purposes of repre-
sentation and taxation. Justice McLean, dissenting in Scott, noted that,
"[I]n the provision respecting the slave trade, in fixing the ratio of repre-
sentation, and providing for the reclamation of fugitives from labor,
slaves were referred to as persons, and in no other respect are they con-
sidered in the Constitution."' 6 This emphasis on personhood arguably
understates, however, the more important debasement of humanity,
namely that slaves were only partially counted and therefore considered,
at best, partial persons.
The fugitive slave clause also protected slavery. Its purpose, to use
governmental power to retrieve runaway slaves, conceals a fundamental
trope regarding the reputation of slaves and black people as criminals
and fugitives of the law absconding from their responsibilities. Thus,
the fugitive slave clause, and the laws through which it was imple-
mented in 1793 and 1850, implied criminality. A fugitive slave was
stealing property in him or herself and evinced laziness by running away
from work responsibilities. Slaves therefore required policing and con-
trol, including through the intervention of Federal governmental author-
ity, in a society where criminal justice and broader police powers
overwhelmingly belonged to the states. Runaway slaves and the legal
concern with them assumed a trope of slave criminality, and therefore
black criminality, which was well established by the time of the Consti-
tutional Convention. As Paul Finkelman notes:
In colonial and early national America color became associated
with inherently criminal behavior in almost every area of law. Fol-
lowing Virginia's lead, most of the British mainland colonies began
to create a legal system that made race a prima facie indication of
criminality.
The colonial laws provided special penalties for blacks, special
crimes for blacks, or criminalized activities merely because a black
was involved. These laws led to the increasingly subordinate status of
blacks. This subordinate status in turn reaffirmed the notion that
black people were to be mistrusted and feared, and that they were
naturally criminal. 7
In theory, one may not have been able to read blackness off of
slavery. While all slaves were black, not all blacks were slaves. Moreo-
ver, free African Americans had the right to a full vote in five states at
the founding of the United States.
At the time of the ratification of the Articles of Confederation,
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
16. Scott, 60 U.S. at 537 (McLean, J., dissenting).
17. Finkelman, supra note 2, at 2093.
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all free native-born inhabitants of the States of New Hampshire, Mas-
sachusetts, New York, New Jersey, and North Carolina, though
descended from African slaves, were not only citizens of those states,
but possessed the franchise of electors on equal terms with other
citizens. '8
In practice, however, the reputation of slavery tainted even free black
people, especially, but not exclusively, in the South. This reality was
worsened by the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 which made it difficult for
free African Americans to avoid being captured because they were
assumed to be runaway slaves. Blackness implied slavery, opening the
way to the "danger of legally sanctioned kidnapping,"' 9 due in part to
legal incentives, such as a ten dollar incentive for federal commissioners
to find in favor of owners with only a five dollar incentive to find for the
alleged runaway.2"
Any meaningful separation between the meaning of being black
and being a slave was undercut by Chief Justice Taney's opinion for the
Court in Scott v. Sandford.2 Taney was persistent, repetitive, and
emphatic in his characterizing of African Americans as "inferior,"22
"subordinate,"23 "unfortunate,"24 and merely "articles of merchan-
dise."25 Some proponents of slavery claimed a caring paternalism for
their human possessions, regarding them as "obedient" children.26 In
contrast, Taney was relentless in his decimation of the reputation of
Africans and people of African origin, denying their humanity, their
legal rights other than those states choose to give them, and condemning
them to perpetual slavery unless individual states chose to offer free-
dom. An almost random example of this rhetoric is the following, which
follows a listing of various laws outlawing miscegenation and inter-
racial marriage:
We give both of these laws in the words used by the respective
legislative bodies, because the language in which they are framed...
show.., the degraded condition of this unhappy race. They... are a
faithful index to the state of feeling toward the class of persons of
whom they speak .... They show that a perpetual and impassable
18. Scott, 60 U.S. at 572-73 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
19. DONALD G. NIEMAN, PROMISES TO KEEP: AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER, 1776 TO THE PRESENT 30 (1991).
20. See id.
21. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
22. Id. at 405.
23. Id. at 404.
24. Id. at 407.
25. Id. at 411.
26. Paul Finkelman, Thomas R.R. Conn and the Law of Negro Slavery, 5 ROGER WILLIAMS U.
L. REV. 75, 103 (1999); see also PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND
LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF JEFFERSON (1996) (regarding proslavery constitutionalism).
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barrier was intended to be erected between the white race and the
one which they had reduced to slavery, and governed as subjects with
absolute and despotic power, and which they then looked upon as so
far below them in the scale of created beings, that intermarriages
between white persons and negroes or mulattoes were regarded as
unnatural and immoral, and punished as crimes, not only in the par-
ties, but in the person who joined them in marriage.... [T]his stigma,
of the deepest degradation, was fixed upon the whole race.27
Taney was leading up to his definitive legal statement regarding the sta-
tus and reputation of all black people in the United States, not just
slaves. Because of their color, continent of origin, and having been
brought to the United States as slaves, black people could never be citi-
zens of the United States, even if they were free and the states wherein
they resided considered them citizens.
III. THE CIVIL RIGHTS CASES AND PLESSY: THE ELUSIVE
REPUTATION OF WHITENESS
In 1853, the Georgia Supreme Court asserted that black people only
won "freedom from the dominion of the master, and the limited liberty
of locomotion."28 Yet even in freedom, they were condemned to "social
and civil degradation," because of the "taint of their blood" and the bib-
lical curse on Ham.29 The only way the reputation of African Americans
could be redeemed was by "an Act of the Assembly. 3°
The passing of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amend-
ments, would easily have appeared to be such an Act of Assembly.
After all, amending the Constitution calls for the acts of many assem-
blies. Moreover, constitutional law is the most authoritative law and
therefore would be expected to have had the greatest impact on changing
the legal and social status of African Americans. Thus, the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments should have invited the legislative acts of purification
of which the Georgia court spoke, and should have been the basis of
undoing the reputation of social and civil degradation under which black
Americans were constrained.
Although the Amendments were used to revoke some of the legal,
social, and civil burdens that oppressed African Americans, the Supreme
Court declined to interpret these laws as useful to the removal of the
mark of social and civil degradation. Instead, the Court confirmed and
27. Scott, 60 U.S. at 409.
28. Bryan v. Walton, 14 Ga. 185, 198 (1853).
29. Id.
30. Id. Interestingly, the court imbues the legislature and the law with a power and authority
greater than the divine. Not only can the biblical curse be lifted by "an Act of the Assembly," but
the "grace" of the Assembly has the power to "purify." Id.
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legitimized the idea that white Americans had and were entitled to good
reputations, whereas black Americans were socially inferior. Further,
the Court held that the law could be used to forcibly exclude black
Americans from commercial and public spaces and facilities.3
The Civil Rights Cases of 1883 consolidated a series of law suits
brought under the 1875 Civil Rights Act.32 Section one of this law pro-
tected the access of all Americans "to the full and equal enjoyment of
the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, pub-
lic conveyances on land and water, theatres, and other places of public
amusement [irrespective of] race and color, and regardless of any previ-
ous condition of servitude." 33 In apparent violation of this law, various
African Americans were denied admission into numerous commercial
facilities and therefore sued. For the Supreme Court, the question was
whether this Civil Rights Act was constitutional. The Court argued that
these commercial facilities were private, whereas the Fourteenth
Amendment only prohibited the states from discriminating against peo-
ple on a basis of their race or color. Moreover, the Court asserted that
Congress only had the power to be reactive against state discrimination.
For the majority, the Civil Rights Act of 1875 impermissibly "step[ped]
into the domain of local jurisprudence"34 by creating "a code of munici-
pal law for the regulation of private rights."35 The Court therefore held
that sections one and two of the law were unconstitutional.36 In contrast,
Justice Harlan, writing in dissent, claimed that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment gave the federal legislature proactive authority or "affirmative
power" to use law "to enforce an express prohibition upon the states."37
Moreover, in his view businesses and other commercial enterprises exist
under state authority and law, and therefore should be considered in the
public domain of state action, not in the private domain of discreet indi-
vidual preferences.38
31. Although the post-Reconstruction period mostly marks a worsening of the fate and
prospects for the rights of African Americans and of equal rights for all, there were some notable
exceptions. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1887) (rejecting a prima facie nonracial
law that was applied in de facto racially discriminatory ways); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303 (1880) (rejecting a West Virginia law limiting jury service to white men).
32. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
33. Id. at 8.
34. Id. at 14.
35. Id. at II.
36. Section two provided penalties for breach of section one. Section four of the Civil Rights
Act of 1875 prohibited racial discrimination in jury selection and created punishments for state
officials who attempted to maintain racially discriminatory juries. The Court held this section to
be constitutional because it was "entirely corrective." Id. at 15.
37. Id. at 45 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
38. Justice Harlan was particularly emphatic about the majority being disingenuous regarding
the limits of federal authority and pointed to the active role the federal government had played in
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For Harlan and African Americans, the Thirteenth Amendment also
gave Congress authority for its civil rights protections in commercial
contexts. The Thirteenth Amendment outlawed slavery, and even the
majority conceded that abolishing slavery also gave "Congress the
power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges
and incidents of slavery in the United States."39 The question then
became the meaning of slavery, and its "badges and incidents." The
majority identified the "incidents" of slavery as "[c]ompulsory service
. . .. restraint of. . . movements, disability to hold property, to make
contracts, to have a standing in court, to be a witness against a white
person, and such like burdens and incapacities."4 ° Justice Bradley rec-
ognized that denial of admittance into commercial and other facilities
could "affect [a] person, his property, or his reputation."'" Yet, he did
not see, nor want to see, that those exclusions involved a person's move-
ment, or ability to hold property, make contracts, be taken seriously as a
witness, and so on. The inability to eat at a restaurant or stay in an inn,
for example, could affect one's ability to negotiate contracts. If one is
not deemed fit to attend a theater performance, then one does not have
the reputation which would allow one's testimony or witness in court to
be taken seriously. Thus, the Court's distinction between social rights to
use commercial facilities and "fundamental rights which appertain to the
essence of citizenship" was a spurious one, due in part to the role of
reputation. The ability to engage in social arenas is part of what shapes
the meaning of citizenship.42
The meaning of slavery, and what was necessary to overcome it,
upholding slavery, which was a local institution particularly with respect to fugitive slaves.
Harlan argued that the majority's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment:
would lead to this anomalous result: that whereas, prior to the amendments,
Congress, with the sanction of this court, passed the most stringent laws . . . in
vindication of slavery and the right of the master, it may not now, by legislation of a
like primary and direct character, guard, protect, and secure the freedom established,
and the most essential right of the citizenship granted, by the constitutional
amendments .... I insist the national legislature may, without transcending the
limits of the Constitution, do for human liberty and the fundamental rights of
American citizenship, what it did, for the sanction of this court, for the protection of
slavery and the rights of the masters of fugitive slaves.
Id. at 53. See also Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind, '" 44 STAN. L.
REV 1, 7, 13 (1991).
39. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20.
40. Id. at 22.
41. Id. at 17.
42. Racial segregation of day-to-day life was key to a federal court's observation that, in
Alabama in the 1960s, "[n]either [jury] commissioners nor clerk have any social contacts with
Negroes or belong to any of the same organizations," as is discussed below. Carter v. Jury
Comm'n of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320, 325 (1970).
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was also at stake in Plessy v. Ferguson.43 While the Court in the Civil
Rights Cases deemed the facilities involved to be private, and therefore
not a matter of state action, the facility at issue in Plessy was public
transportation and racially separate railway carriages. The logic of the
Civil Rights Cases and supposed private spaces should have implied that
this public segregation was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment. In Justice Harlan's logic, it should also have been uncon-
stitutional under the Thirteenth Amendment. He emphasized that slav-
ery was based on an assumption of black racial inferiority, and therefore
eliminating slavery would involve banning racial discrimination in all
areas within governmental law and power.
The distinctions between the majority and Justice Harlan on the
meaning of slavery are even clearer in Plessy. Justice Brown, writing
for the majority, defined slavery as "involuntary servitude-a state of
bondage; the ownership of mankind as chattel, or at least the control of
the labor and services of one man for the benefit of another, and the
absence of a legal right to the disposal of his own person, property and
services. ' ' " In contrast, Harlan believed that slavery concerned freedom
and any right involved in freedom. Thus, ending slavery "decreed uni-
versal civil freedom"45 in the United States and outlawed the use or
"imposition" of symbols of slavery. In this world view, racial discrimi-
nation-the idea that "colored citizens are so inferior and degraded that
they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by white citi-
zens" 4 6-is a symbol of slavery that carries with it the reputation of
slavery, a reputation of inferiority, which constitutes an impermissible
burden or disability.47
In contrast, the majority in Plessy accepted social "distinctions
based upon color"48 and the claim that it was perfectly "reasonable" 49
for the legislature of Louisiana to maintain them. On the one hand,
Justice Brown claimed that laws requiring racial segregation "do not
necessarily imply the inferiority of either race."5 ° Indeed, he claimed
that any suggestion of inferiority created was because African Ameri-
cans chose to view the legislation that way. On the other hand, the
majority clearly reflected assumptions of white superiority in its accept-
43. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
44. Id. at 542.
45. Id. at 555 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 560.
47. See id. at 555.
48. Id. at 544.
49. Id. at 550.
50. Id. at 544.
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ance of whiteness as a property claim;5' that being white is more valua-
ble than being black or non-white. The greater value of whiteness is the
value of reputation that is an implicitly good reputation. Thus Brown
writes:
If he be a white man and assigned to a colored coach, he may
have his action for damages against the company for being deprived
of his so called property. Upon the other hand, if he be a colored
man and be so assigned, he has been deprived of no property, since
he is not lawfully entitled to the reputation of being a white man. 52
Moreover, the Civil Rights Cases make related assumptions about
white superiority. Alluding to the Reconstruction Amendments, the
Court defined the legislation as "beneficent."53 Given that whites held
electoral and legislative majorities in the construction of those additions
to the Constitution, the Court gave credit to whites with noblesse oblige
magnanimity, similar to the caring paternalism pro-slavery advocates
purported to shower upon slaves. Yet, when African Americans wanted
to claim the equal rights promised to them by the "beneficent legisla-
tion," the majority claimed they wanted to be "the special favorite of the
laws"54 and enjoy white privileges, presumably including status and
reputation.
IV. BROWN. ENDING SEGREGATION AS INFERIORITY
Brown v. Board of Education had at its core the idea that denying
African Americans the right to education in white schools "generates
feelings of inferiority," or that "separating the races is usually inter-
preted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group."55 Whereas the
51. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 5.
52. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 549.
53. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
54. Id. Reading these decisions by the distance of over a century, one is struck by how both
of the majorities in these cases, as well as Justice Harlan who wrote that "[e]very true man has
pride of race," are perfectly comfortable thinking and writing in the language of white race
identity and white race pride. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 554 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In contrast, in the
contemporary United States whiteness is generally assumed as the norm, and race (or ethnic) pride
is seen, almost across the political spectrum, to properly reside among racial and ethnic minorities
and not whites. This discomfort with the whiteness of whites rests in numerous factors, including
the history of supposed white supremacy and its attendant politics. It also rests in the failure to
see the role of whiteness in policies, practices, and laws, that is, in dominant and dominating
norms. Barbara Flagg refers to this pattern as the "transparency phenomenon: the tendency of
whites not to think about whiteness, or about norms, behaviors, experiences, or perspectives that
are white-specific. Transparency often is the mechanism through which white decision makers
who disavow white supremacy impose white norms on blacks." Barbara Flagg, "Was Blind, But
Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MIcH.
L. REV. 953, 957 (1993).
55. Brown v. Bd of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (citing Belton v. Gebhardt, 87 A.2d 862,
865 (Del. Ct. 1952)).
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majority in Plessy blamed African Americans for feeling slighted by
segregation, Brown pointed to the obvious reason for Jim Crow laws,
namely that whites did believe themselves to be superior to blacks, and
wished to maintain a sense of racial purity and separateness through seg-
regation. Whatever subsequent commentary or debate Brown raises,
there is no doubt that segregation was intended to assert and to protect
beliefs in white superiority and Brown made clear that this practice vio-
lated the Constitution. Segregation included a commitment to asserting
and maintaining the good reputation of whites and the bad reputation of
blacks. The nebulous terms "good" and "bad" appropriately capture the
wide array of values with which they could be filled. That is, if segrega-
tion automatically gave white people or schools good reputations, deseg-
regation and, later, integration would require positive or negative
attributions to be assigned in purportedly color-blind categories such as,
in the case of schools, educational quality or school funding. More fun-
damentally, Brown and the civil rights movement marked the early
beginnings of major shifts in and conflict over relative racial power and
the relationship between race and the distribution of societal benefits and
burdens. Inextricably linked to this point, and of equal importance, is
the highly contested nature of the terms of debate in legal and broader
socio-political discourse.
Profound inequalities exist in the United States, and these are
linked to and based upon race in both complex and simple ways. Not-
withstanding these schisms, one of the most important changes achieved
by the civil rights movement and, arguably, the Court in Brown is a new
hegemonic norm whereby most members of society claim to reject
beliefs in racial inferiority and superiority. Most Americans would
claim to believe that, irrespective of race, everyone in the United States
should be treated equally in law and in other spheres of social life. The
Supreme Court certainly claims to actively pursue the Fourteenth
Amendment's promise of equal protection of the laws. It has character-
ized its endeavors to "eradicate racial prejudice from our criminal justice
system" as "unceasing efforts."56 Nevertheless, racial reputations exist
recalling old stereotypes and invoking new and more complex ideas
about the meaning of blackness and whiteness. Although the terms in
which they are phrased are not the stark prejudices of the pre-Brown era,
the discourse and decisions of the Supreme Court are no exception.
V. JURIES, COMMUNITY TRUST, AND CITIZEN REPUTATION
Juries and jurors provide important challenges to racialized and
56. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 309 (1986).
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racist thinking. The idea that the right to a jury trial is a person's "right
to be tried by a jury of his peers"57 assumes that the prosecutor and
defendant both consider jurors to be competent and fair, and not
prejudiced by racial, legal, or other perspectives. Randall Kennedy
identifies two harms involved in discriminatory exclusion of African
Americans from juries. The first is the reputational harm to the black
community in general, for they are stigmatized by virtue of the exclu-
sion. The second is that African American defendants are denied the
opportunity to have other African Americans determine their disputes. 8
Although the Court rejected the exclusion of African Americans
from juries as early as 1879, in Strauder v. West Virginia,59 far-reaching
reforms to ensure racially diverse jury pools did not begin until the
1960s. 6° Furthermore, bias in jury selection remains a contemporary
problem, especially in the criminal justice system.6' Indeed, although
ruled unconstitutional by the Court in Batson v. Kentucky,62 racist uses
of the peremptory challenge are still widespread. 63 Such racial exclu-
sions often have a reputational dimension to them, intended or not. In
his concurring opinion in Batson, Justice Marshall pointed out that "[a]
prosecutor's conscious or unconscious racism may lead him easily to the
conclusion that a prospective black juror is 'sullen' or 'distant,' a char-
acterization that would not have come to his mind if a white juror had
acted identically. 64 Other exclusions may be based on the old and well-
established criminal reputation assigned to African Americans, or may
be combined with an acknowledgment of the disproportionate impact of
contemporary criminal justice policies on black Americans.
Previous adverse involvement with the criminal justice system is one
of the most commonly cited explanations prosecutors give for strik-
ing black potential jurors. Given that a relatively large percentage of
the black population has been arrested or convicted or is closely
related to someone who has been arrested or convicted, this rationale
for striking jurors could serve as an efficient pretext for what are, in
57. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
58. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW 170-71 (1997).
59. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
60. KENNEDY, supra note 58, at 179.
61. DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 101, ch. 3 (1999).
62. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
63. Cole, supra note 61, at 115-23; KENNEDY, supra note 58, ch. 6. According to Batson,
where the defense believes the prosecutor appears to be using the peremptory challenge in a
racially biased manner and can make a prima facie case to that effect, the prosecutor then has the
burden of providing a nonracial reason for the apparently racial challenges. Invariably,
prosecutors can and do provide ex post facto nonracial reasons for their apparently racially-based
actions.
64. Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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fact, racially discriminatory strikes.65
Additionally, prosecutors may believe black people are less likely to
find other African Americans guilty or give defendants the death pen-
alty.66 Beyond the problem of peremptory challenge lies the broader
obstacle of ensuring diverse jury pools and juries.
In Carter v. Jury Commission of Greene County, the Supreme
Court dealt with the constitutionality of "key-man"67 jury list selection.
Under this system, the potential jury roll should contain "the names of
all qualified, nonexempt citizens in the county ... who are 'generally
reputed to be honest and intelligent and are esteemed in the community
for their integrity, good character and sound judgement."' 68 Among
other attributes that automatically excluded potential jurors were an age
requirement-jurors had to be over twenty-one-and inability to read
English, though the literacy requirement could be waived should a per-
son be a "freeholder or householder."69 In Greene County, although
African Americans comprised about seventy-five percent of the popula-
tion, between 1961 and 1963 only seven percent of the jury list was
black.7" Following a statutory amendment in 1967, the proportion of
African Americans went up dramatically, to a paltry thirty-two
percent.7 '
Recalling its decision in Strauder v. West Virginia,7 2 the Court held
that excluding blacks from jury duty was racially discriminatory and
branded African Americans as inferior.73 Consequently, the Court
affirmed the lower court's grant of injunctive relief requiring new proce-
dures to ensure that black citizens would be included on the jury lists. It
declined, however, to declare Alabama's key-man method and its reli-
ance on citizen reputation unconstitutional. In doing so, the Court relied
on its long-standing distinction between facially or overtly racially-
biased legislation, and racially neutral legislation. According to the
Court, whatever the abuses in practice, Alabama's method of identifying
potential jurors fell into the latter category. Furthermore, the Court held
65. KENNEDY, supra note 58, at 211.
66. Because of the disproportionate and negative impact criminal justice policies and
practices have on the African American, as well as Latino, communities, these fears of jury
nullification may not be unfounded. See, e.g., Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification:
Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995); KENNEDY, supra note 58,
ch. 8.
67. KENNEDY, supra note 58, at 182,
68. Carter v. Jury Comm'n of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320, 323 (1970).
69. Id. at 323 n.2.
70. Id. at 327.
71. Id. at 327-28.
72. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
73. Greene County, 396 U.S at 329.
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that states have the right to use an array of criteria, such as age or educa-
tional status, as well as subjective assessments of a person's good repu-
tation, from "sound judgement" to being of "good character."74
What the Court failed to see was that notions of good moral charac-
ter and other criteria of good public reputation may well be tied to racial
and racist understandings of reputation. In contrast, the appellants rec-
ognized that ideas of appropriate reputation were the precise bases for
excluding black citizens from the jury lists. The Court noted "that § 21
leaves the commissioners free to give effect to their belief that Negroes
are generally inferior to white people and so less likely to measure up to
the statutory requirements."75 Nevertheless, the Justices did not appear
to understand the import and implication of what they continued to
allow. Merely echoing the language of apparently race-neutral exclu-
sion, the Court underscored that jury lists could and should reflect those
citizens "suitable in character and intelligence."76 Yet, the Court had
evidence which demonstrated precisely how notions of race were tied
into notions of reputation. Quoting from the trial court's opinion, which
included an examination of how potential jurors came to be included on
the jury lists, the Court noted:
The clerk ... is acquainted with a good many Negroes, but very
few 'out in the county.' She does not know the reputation of most of
the Negroes in the county. Because of her duties as clerk of the Cir-
cuit Court the names and reputations of Negroes most familiar to her
are those who have been convicted of crime or have been 'in trouble.'
She does not know any Negro ministers, does not seek names from
any Negro or white churches or fraternal organizations. She obtains
some names from the county's Negro deputy sheriff.77
For the clerk, therefore, "Negroes" were excluded for not being
74. Id. at 323.
75. Id. at 331.
76. Id. at 333 (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 553, 474 (1953)). My point is not that we
would not want intelligent jurors of good character, but rather that using these criteria to build jury
lists is open to bias and abuse. These need not be racial; one could well imagine a Jewish or
Buddhist citizen being excluded from the list because they had the wrong religious character in a
strongly Christian fundamentalist jurisdiction. Statutes should delimit any objective category of
people to be excluded. My own preference would be for very few exclusions, but I realize that
others would differ. For instance, I see no intrinsic reasons why law-abiding ex-prisoners should
be denied the right to jury duty any more than any other law-abiding person. Moreover, excluding
former felons from the franchise has the effect of racially discrimination. Yet, such a criterion
makes clear distinctions. Thus, it is not, open to subjective judgments, such as whether one
member of a community believes someone has redeemed their character of reputation through or
following imprisonment (think of Karla Faye Tucker), while another believes their character and
reputation remains flawed. After generating neutral jury lists, it would be up to lawyers and
prosecutors to use their challenges for cause to remove jurors who demonstrate insufficient
intelligence, bias, or other relevant character flaws.
77. Id. at 324-25.
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within her understanding of community. They were either rural or not
members of the groups she deemed to have a positive reputation, such as
white churches or fraternal organizations. Second, to the extent she was
"familiar" with African Americans, the familiarity was based precisely
on a criminal or suspect reputation.
Furthermore, the white jury commission members also saw African
Americans as outside the community: "Neither commissioners nor
clerks have any social contacts with Negroes or belong to any of the
same organizations." While the Court emphasized that juries represent
the community which is composed of "neighbors, fellows, associates,
and persons having the same legal status in society"78 the justices
refused to accept that the whites did not understand themselves to share
a community with the black citizens of Greene County. For the whites
of Greene County, identifying reputable jurors meant identifying white
jurors or black jurors who represented white interests. Thus, the appel-
lants complained of the "commissioners' preference for Negroes who
tend not to assert their right to legal and social equality."79
The Court repeatedly insisted that the facially neutral provisions of
Alabama's jury selection process made it non-racial in fact. Neverthe-
less, it ignored the glaring problems of the jury commission of Greene
County. While the district court's opinion highlighted the above-men-
tioned whiteness of the commissioners, clerk, and their social world, as
well as the negative connotations with which these whites associated
blacks and blackness, the Supreme Court played Pollyanna. The appel-
lants argued that Alabama's governor intentionally chose a segregated
jury commission. In contrast, the Court rewrote that allegation as a
problem in which "even the best-intentioned white jury commissioners
are unlikely to know many Negroes who satisfy the statutory qualifica-
tions."8 The Court insisted that there was no basis to read persistent all-
white commissions as excluding blacks. Although the Court recognized
that "white jury officials in Alabama generally regard Negroes as inca-
pable of satisfying the prerequisites for jury membership,"8 it provided
no mechanism to address this inherent problem of black reputation in
white eyes. Instead, it left reputation in place as the central basis for
jury selection in Alabama and other states.
Problems relating to the reputation of jurors and how juries are con-
78. Id. at 330.
79. Id. at 331. There is a pun, no doubt unintended, in the Court's decision. It affirms that:
"The States remain free to confine the selection of citizens, to persons meeting specified
qualifications of age and educational attainment, and to those possessing good intelligence, sound
judgment, and fair character." Id. at 332.
80. Id. at 337.
81. Id.
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structed by racial prejudice are not confined to the South of the 1960s
and early 1970s. Amy Kastely provides an example of negative racial
reputations in the early 1990s in New Jersey.82 In United States v.
Uwaezhoke,83 the Third Circuit upheld "raced reasoning"84 when it
allowed the prosecutor to use a peremptory challenge to strike an Afri-
can American from the jury. By some accounts, the potential juror, Kim
Lucas, was the model of hard-working respectability. She had worked
for the same employer for four years, lived in the same home for five
years, took care of her children, and remained physically fit. She had
neither used drugs nor had she been a victim of crime. For the prosecu-
tor, however, she raised reputational alarm bells. Her employer was the
United States Postal Service, her home was rented, and she was a single
parent. That, plus the fact that Ms. Lucas was black, was enough for the
prosecutor to conclude that she "may be involved in a drug situation
where she lives."8" Kastely elaborates on the implication of this
decision:
[I]t is as if, for the judges and the prosecutor, the metonymic associa-
tions among blackness, single motherhood, and poverty are stronger
than any empirical connection between postal service employment
and a good salary. And the only reason [the prosecutor or judges
had] to infer that Lucas lived in "low-income housing" was that she is
black: the term "low-income housing" is itself a code for govern-
ment-subsidized housing projects that are used to warehouse
thousands of black people with low income ... Lucas herself stated
under oath that she had virtually no involvement with drug usage.86
VI. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE DEATH PENALTY: INNOCENCE
AND THE VALUE OF LIFE
The examples discussed above, which identify the Court's concerns
with racial reputation, have pointed to reputations being assigned to
blackness or whiteness. A particularly telling instance of racial reputa-
tion concerns the association of whiteness with "innocence" in various
affirmative action cases.87 In Regents of the University of California v.
82. See Amy H. Kastely, Out of the Whiteness: On Raced Codes and White Race
Consciousness in Some Tort, Criminal, and Contract Law, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 269 (1994).
83. United States v. Uwaezhoke, 995 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1091
(1994).
84. Kastely, supra note 82, at 286.
85. Uwaezhoke, 995 F.2d at 391.
86. Kastely, supra note 82, at 288-89.
87. Interestingly, because many of those opposing race-based affirmative action are men,
notions of innocence are potentially gendered and raced. (Of course, not all are men, such as
Wendy Wygant in Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ, 476 U.S. 267 (1986)). For a discussion of the
problem of treating race and gender as mutually exclusive categories as reflected in
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Bakke,88 the Court examined affirmative action in a medical school and
both permitted and limited the right of educational institutions to use
affirmative action to redress past racism. Justice Powell asserted that
"there is a measure of inequity in forcing innocent persons in respon-
dent's position to bear the burdens of redressing grievances not of their
making."89 In this case, the "innocent" person90 was a white male, Alan
Bakke, though the opinion stressed the potential for an array of groups
to be harmed, as well as to claim to be victims of historical harm.91
Likewise, in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,92 where senior
white teachers were laid off so that junior African American teachers
could keep their jobs, the majority emphasized the harm done to the
innocent white teachers and stated, "[w]e have previously expressed
concern over the burden that a preferential-layoffs scheme imposes on
innocent parties." '93 In contrast, Justice Marshall's dissent emphasized
that the lay-offs were a product of a protracted collective bargaining
agreement to redress a long history of discrimination in hiring, and had,
following difficult negotiations, been supported by a majority of all
teachers .9
The framing of whites as innocent parties in affirmative action
decisions is significant in a number of respects. First, by innocence, the
Court means that those white people who are denied social benefits that
they might otherwise have received are not in any way responsible for
antidiscrimination law, see Kimberle Crenshaw, A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination
Law and Politics, in THE POLrIcs OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 195 (David Kairys ed.,
1990). The question of the connection between racial and gender reputations is an enquiry I hope
to examine in the future.
88. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
89. Id. at 298 (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 308.
91. The Court argued:
During the dormancy of the Equal Protection Clause, the United States had become
a Nation of minorities. Each had to struggle-and to some extent struggles still-to
overcome the prejudices not of a monolithic majority, but of a "majority" composed
of various minority groups of whom it was said-perhaps unfairly in many cases-
that a shared characteristic was a willingness to disadvantage other groups. As the
Nation filled with the stock of many lands, the reach of the Clause was gradually
extended to all ethnic groups seeking protection from official discrimination.
Id. at 292 (citations omitted). Because I have grave misgivings about the mainstream construal of
issues regarding race and ethnicity being portrayed in minority-majority terms (a subject beyond
the scope of this Article), I am in some sense sympathetic to the Court's identification of a "nation
of minorities." The broader implication of equally situated minority groups, however, is one that I
reject. The historical and contemporary record shows vast differences in disadvantage and
privilege experienced by different groups who therefore are not similarly situated with respect to
the societal distribution of benefits and burdens.
92. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
93. Id. at 282.
94. Id. at 296-300 (Marshall, J., dissenting),
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historic racial discrimination and oppression. The Court's claim is that
innocent whites are paying a debt incurred by previous generations,
rather than that of their own generation. While there may be contexts in
which this scenario applies, the Court ignores the generalized benefits
whites have been accorded through centuries of white privilege that has
positive effects for whites today. As Justice Marshall argued in his
Bakke dissent:
It is unnecessary in 20th-century America to have individual
Negroes demonstrate that they have been victims of racial discrimi-
nation; the racism of our society has been so pervasive that none,
regardless of wealth or position, has managed to escape its impact.
The experience of Negroes in America has been different in kind, not
just in degree, from that of other ethnic groups. It is not merely the
history of slavery alone but also that a whole people were marked as
inferior by the law. And that mark has endured.95
Among other measures of these benefits is the disparity in wealth, rather
than income, between blacks and whites. John Calmore notes that
"[t]here is a tremendous gap between black and white asset holdings or
wealth.... [I]n terms of mean net financial assets, poverty-level whites
come close to controlling a similar amount of wealth as do the highest
earning blacks: $26,683 to $28,310, respectively. 96 Thus although
some African Americans have dramatically improved their incomes, the
legacy of inherited wealth remains important for income stratification
and associated status and opportunity. Whether individual whites have
personally discriminated against blacks or others does not exempt whites
from at least the protection and often the privileges which whiteness
allows. The legacy of differential racial advantage is too complex for it
to be reduced to mere "guilt" or "innocence."
Second, the emphasis on white innocence is particularly disturbing
given the pairings of guilt and innocence as linked binaries in the
broader language and culture, and perhaps especially in the legal arena.
If whites, who are no longer privileged by whiteness due to affirmative
action decisions, are innocent, then the implication is that blacks or other
beneficiaries of affirmative action are guilty. In this logic or context,
social goods are distributed in a zero sum game, and redistribution is
inherently unfair because the guilty are rewarded with social goods.
Thus, African Americans and other affirmative action beneficiaries
become guilty and responsible for the burden on individual whites. In
95. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 400 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
96. John 0. Calmore, Dismantling the Master's House: Essays in Memory of Trina Grillo:
Random Notes of an Integration Warrior, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1441, 1458 (1997).
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reality, however, affirmative action is a social tax on the conscious and
intentional distortions and harms of the past that shape our society.
Third, innocence evokes its opposite, guilt. This evocation is espe-
cially dangerous and invidious in the context of the criminal justice sys-
tem. As has already been noted there is a lengthy history of associating
blackness with criminality. The contemporary focus on racial profiling
is an indicator of the persistence of this linkage and, possibly, its exacer-
bation. Racial profiling is, however, only one consequence of assigning
a criminal reputation to African Americans. This reputation is an impor-
tant, but not one explanation of the disproportionate subjection of Afri-
can Americans and Latinos to criminal justice system surveillance,
interaction, prosecution, and punishment. At almost every point in the
criminal justice system black people are more likely to be suspects and
to experience harsher punishments than whites. As David Harris notes:
African-Americans are just 12% of the population and 13% of
the drug users, but they are about 38% of all those arrested for drug
offenses, 59% of all those convicted of drug offenses, and 63% of all
those convicted for drug trafficking. While only 33% of whites who
are convicted are sent to prison, 50% of convicted blacks are jailed,
and blacks who are sent to prison receive higher sentences than
whites for the same crimes. 97
The trope and reputation of white innocence may also relate to the
trope of black criminal reputation and contemporary bias in another
way. By disproportionately seeking the death penalty for the murder of
whites more often than for the murder of blacks, the criminal justice
system appears to value the loss of innocent murdered whites more than
the loss of African Americans and other people of color. In McCleskey
v. Kemp,98 the Supreme Court learned that the victim's race was "the
most consistent and powerful factor"9 9 in determining whether a person
was sentenced to death. A killer of a white person in Georgia was 4.3
times more likely to receive a death sentence than a killer of a black
person."°° The influence of the victim's race was more important than
97. David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving While Black"
Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 297 (1999) (citations omitted).
98. 481 U.S. 279 (1986).
99. KENNEDY, supra note 58, at 329.
100. Using actual numbers of real people concerned, Justice Brennan noted that:
Since our decision upholding the Georgia capital sentencing system in Gregg, the
State has executed seven persons. All of the seven were convicted of killing whites,
and six of the seven executed were black. Such execution figures are especially
striking in light of the fact that, during the period encompassed by the Baldus study,
only 9.2% of Georgia homicides involved black defendants and white victims, while
60.7% involved black victims.
McClesky, 481 U.S. at 327 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
"whether the defendant was a prime mover in the homicide ... [and]
nearly as crucial as the statutory aggravating circumstance whether the
defendant had a prior record of a conviction for a capital crime."'' The
Court did not refute this statistical evidence produced by academic
David Baldus and accepted the probability that "the Baldus study indi-
cates a discrepancy that appears to correlate with race." ' 2 It argued,
however, that Warren McCleskey, the convicted prisoner, had not estab-
lished racial discrimination in his own case. The Court gave no indica-
tion that the discrepancy identified in the statistics disturbed the justices
in the majority. Indeed, one of the reasons they gave for not taking
McCleskey's claim to its "logical conclusion"' 3-the inference of a
widespread, unconstitutional role of racism in the criminal justice sys-
tem-was that it "throws into serious question the principles that under-
lie our entire criminal justice system."'' 0 4 For anyone genuinely opposed
to racial prejudice in society, and for anyone who takes Fourteenth
Amendment and other constitutional protections seriously, McCleskey
not only calls into question the roles of race and racism in shaping con-
temporary criminal justice, but also calls for urgent changes to that
reality. 105
The value of whiteness in both capital punishment and affirmative
action cases may also be explained by the property interest in whiteness
and by the relationship between reputation and property. Cheryl Harris
argues that the political and economic power that whites accrued
through slavery, segregation, and racial domination has led to whites
identifying "white privilege... [as] a property interest worthy of protec-
tion."' 1 6 Alan Bakke, for example, "had a property interest in a space in
the [medical school] class."' 0 Affirmative action programs seek to
upset white privilege, and are therefore opposed by whites in order to
prevent any redistribution that the redress of discrimination may involve.
For instance, "Bakke expected that he would never be disfavored when
competing with minority candidates, although he might be disfavored
101. Id. at 355 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 312.
103. Id. at 314.
104. Id. at 315. Regarding the relevance of the Baldus study to the death penalty beyond
Georgia, Cole notes that "[iln 1990, the General Accounting Office reviewed twenty-eight
empirical studies of race and the death penalty, and concluded that 82 percent of the studies
demonstrated that the race of the victim influenced the likelihood of the defendant being charged
with or receiving the death penalty." COLE, supra note 61, at 134.
105. See COLE, supra note 61, at 137 (arguing that "McCleskey may be the single most
important decision the Court has ever issued on the subject of race and crime").
106. Harris, supra note 5, at 1768.
107. Id. at 1773.
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with respect to other more privileged whites."' 8 Affirmative action
programs, at once narrowed and increasingly rejected by the Court,
evince a Court protecting the reputation of white innocence and the
property interest that reputation allows. In contrast, the reputation of
black criminality allows for greater black prosecution in the criminal
justice system. Furthermore the reputation of black people as inferior
hides or justifies the lesser protection of black victims whose lives are
less worthy of capital prosecutions.' 0 9 Because reputation lies, in part,
in the value of the person, esteem for people is linked to valuing life,
individually and collectively. That involves protecting the individual
body and, by extension, the body politic-hence the historic exclusion
and today's sometimes ambiguous inclusion of African Americans in
republican government. As Harris notes:
The conception of reputation as property found its origins in
early concepts of property that encompassed things (such as land and
personality), income (such as revenues from leases, mortgages, and
patent monopolies), and one's life, liberty, and labor. Thus, Locke's
famous pronouncement, "every man has a 'property' in his own 'per-
son,'" undergirded the assertion that one's physical self was one's
property.... The idea of self-ownership, then, was particularly fertile
ground for the idea that reputation, as an aspect of identity earned
through effort, was similarly property.110
VII. THE DEATH PENALTY, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND THE
DISRUPTION OF THE SOCIAL ORDER
Affirmative action and death penalty cases share another similarity,
at least in the cases of Washington v. Davis"' and McCleskey v. Kemp.
In these cases, African American litigants are cast as challengers to the
"American way" and the apparently correct status quo, perhaps as a
recourse to the trope of black rebellion, from slave uprisings to "uppity
blacks." In both cases, one of the important reasons the Court offers for
not finding on behalf of the black claimants is that to do so would be too
disruptive to the economic, social, and political order. The Supreme
Court does not suggest that the prevailing balance of power in the
United States is particularly just or equitable, but rather that it needs to
108. Id. (emphasis added).
109. For those, like myself, who oppose capital punishment entirely, the solution to race-based
capital punishment disparities does not, of course, lie in increasing the number of capital trials of
executions of whites or anybody else. But the disparate attempt by prosecutors seeking the death
penalty is a powerful political commentary about the role of racial reputation in organizing and
policing the political and human community.
110. Harris, supra note 5, at 1735 (notes omitted).
111. Mayor of Washington, D.C., et al., v. Davis et al., 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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be protected from radical disruptions or rearrangement. Black or non-
white litigants are those who represent a challenge to the prevailing sta-
tus quo.
In Davis, African American applicants to the Washington D.C.
police force argued that a civil service exam was discriminatory because
black applicants failed it at a grossly disproportionate rate relative to
white applicants.' 1 2 Among the reasons the Court gave for rejecting this
argument was that, if it were to consider the disparate impact of social
policies on the vulnerable sectors of society, widespread and perhaps
even wholesale economic redistribution and social re-engineering would
occur."I3  Thus the Court notes that if statutes were found unconstitu-
tional because "in practice [the law] benefits or burdens one race more
than the other," it would be too challenging to the prevailing status
quo. I4 Indeed, the Supreme Court argued that such a rule would be "far
reaching and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invali-
date, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and
licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the
average black than to the more affluent white."' ' 5 Likewise, the highest
Court recognized that McCleskey questions the fairness and equity of the
criminal justice system at large:
Thus, if we accepted McCleskey's claim that racial bias has imper-
missibly tainted the capital sentencing decision, we could soon be
faced with similar claims as to other types of penalty. Moreover, the
claim that his sentence rests on the irrelevant factor of race easily
could be extended to apply to claims based on unexplained discrepan-
cies that correlate to membership in other minority groups, and even
to gender.' 16
112. Davis, 426 U.S. at 232-34.
113. Id. at 248.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 314-17 (1986) (citations omitted). The Court
attempted to trivialize McCleskey's claim of an illegitimate correlation of race in the criminal
justice system by suggesting that any number of spurious demographic or other correlations could
be drawn between criminal justice actions and actors that suggested a disproportionate presence of
one or another demographic group. Thus it wrote:
Similarly, since McCleskey's claim relates to the race of his victim, other claims
could apply with equally logical force to statistical disparities that correlate with the
race or sex of other actors in the criminal justice system, such as defense attorneys
or judges. Also, there is no logical reason that such a claim need be limited to racial
or sexual bias. If arbitrary and capricious punishment is the touchstone under the
Eighth Amendment, such a claim could-at least in theory-be based upon any
arbitrary variable, such as the defendant's facial characteristics, or the physical
attractiveness of the defendant or the victim, that some statistical study indicates
may be influential in jury decision making. As these examples illustrate, there is no
limiting principle to the type of challenge brought by McCleskey. The Constitution
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In neither Davis nor McCleskey does the Supreme Court shy away
from recognizing deep-rooted inequalities and inequities both, potential
and actual, in the American legal-judicial, economic, and political order.
It is, however, black litigants who highlight these potential and actual
injustices, and the Court declines to support the black challenge. This
refusal to accept such a far-reaching and deep-rooted confrontation to
the status quo is not because the justices necessarily disagree with the
conclusions about unfairness and discrimination in the status quo.
Rather, the challenge is rejected because it is too fundamental to the
prevailing distribution of benefits and burdens in society.
As such, the claims of the black complainants are rejected as too
radical, too un-American, too disruptive, and too socially disorganizing.
The consequence and implication of this choice is that blacks-or at
least those people, mainly of color, who challenge fundamental Ameri-
can inequity-are dangerous and un-American. In this way, the Court
adopts a long-standing reputational trope of African-Americans as peo-
ple who violate the natural order by challenging the social order. This
confrontation of the existing balance of power and the calls for the redis-
tribution of societal privilege and punishment, rights and responsibili-
ties, is not cast as consistent with the American heroism of the
Revolution, President Lincoln and the Emancipation Proclamation,
Brown, or Martin Luther King as civil right hero, but as the work of
rebels, deviants, and cheeky blacks. This reputational thinking of the
Court recalls the pattern of American public opinion in which civil
rights calls for greater justice and equality in the United States are seen
as and responded to as threats to the real and good American order. As
Scott Christianson notes, "common assertions that lawlessness ... [is]
shooting up in response to social 'permissiveness"' is often a sine qua
non for "civil rights for Negroes." I7 It is in this sense that the broader
American polity, as well as the Supreme Court, accepted and embraced
a link between "tough on crime," "law and order" rhetoric, and the
emergence of expanded civil rights, including in the expansion of the
does not require that a State eliminate any demonstrable disparity that correlates
with a potentially irrelevant factor in order to operate a criminal justice system that
includes capital punishment. As we have stated specifically in the context of capital
punishment, the Constitution does not "plac[e] totally unrealistic conditions on its
use." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S., at 199, n.50.
Id. at 317-19 (citations omitted). The limits of the Court's claim lie, at least in part, in its own
jurisprudential history, which recognizes that race and gender categories deserve strict and
intermediate scrutiny because of the history of unconstitutional discrimination associated with
race and gender.
117. ScoTr CHRISTIANSON, WITH LIBERTY FOR SOME: 500 YEARS OF IMPRISONMENT IN
AMERICA 275 (1998).
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franchise to historically excluded groups. 1 8
VIII. CONCLUSION
The differential reputation of whites and African Americans in
United States history and politics has played itself out in the field of law,
including the decisions of the Supreme Court. The nadir of the Court's
discourse on race and reputation was during slavery, especially as dis-
played in the Scott decision. But the Court's reluctance to fundamen-
tally repudiate a view of white superiority and black inferiority was
evinced in both the facts and the language of decisions which declined to
accord African Americans and other people of color their full rights and
the associated reputation of human equals. While the Court used Brown
to challenge not just segregation and inequality but the reputation of
inferiority which undergirded it, the same degree of introspection or
political commitment has not marked the more recent Supreme Court
decisions. Under the guise of race neutrality, colorblindness, and equal
protection of the laws irrespective of race, and using an analysis of
affirmative action and an instance of capital sentencing review, we see
that the Court has again valorized whites and the reputation of white-
ness, and accepted a denigration of black life and African American
repute. While assessments of the Court's comments on race profiling
itself are beyond the scope of this article, it is clear that the Court's
discourse contributes to a world view in which racial profiling and other
acts of civil and criminal justice discrimination can find legitimation.
118. A. Leon Higginbotham underscores the importance of voting rights in the constitution of
racial reputation and political and economic opportunities, in contemporary and historic terms:
Many whites have used means-subtle and blatant-to deny African Americans
voting rights and thereby to enforce the precepts of African-American inferiority
and African-American powerlessness. The current congressional redistricting
controversy during the 1990s has been triggered by a series of United States
Supreme Court opinions that, for the 1990s, has been almost as retrogressive as
were the Supreme Court's opinions in the 1896 Plessy v. Ferguson era. Many will
view the 1990s decisions as a re-incorporation of some aspects of the shameful
history of white supremacy, a process that was designed to safeguard white control
and to exclude African Americans from significant political power.
A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND PRESUMPTIONS OF THE
AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 182 (1996).
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